Brainstorming: Possible Seminar Topics (Spring 2026)

As usual, I post a few of the ideas I have for a seminar in order to get feedback. That is, each of the following topics is a possible topic for my Spring 2026 seminar, and I need to choose one of them. The default is ‘Inversion’, but I could be persuaded to do one of the others, if there is enough interest.

1. Inversion

This course will look at a wide variety of inversion constructions cross-linguistically, including: quotative inversion, locative inversion, inverse copular constructions, subject-object inversion in Bantu, as well as other related constructions. The goal will be to show how these constructions fit into the theory of argument structure and voice of Collins (2024) (‘Principles of Argument Structure’, MIT Press) (see also Storment 2025 ‘Projection (your) Voice: A Theory of Inversion and Defective Circumvention’, Doctoral dissertation, Stony Brook). Students will be given the opportunity to do fieldwork with a consultant during the course of the semester.

2. Foundations of Minimalism

This course will discuss foundational issues in syntactic theory, including the notion of Merge, copies versus repetitions and workspaces. Discussion will focus on Marcolli (2025) (‘Mathematical Structure of Syntactic Merge’, MIT Press) and related papers (e.g., Chomsky et. al. ‘Merge and the Strong Minimalist Thesis’ CUP). By the end of the semester, students will write papers in the framework of Marcolli (2025), or write papers critiquing that framework.

3. Large Language Models and Generative Syntax

This course will review literature concerning the relationship between Large Language Models and linguistic theory. Some of the topics of interest include: (a) What is the basic architecture of a LLM? (e.g., How are vectors used for lexical representation?) (b) How are LLMs able to produce fluent and natural English text? (c) Can LLMs be taken as a possible theory of the human language faculty? (d) If not, can LLMs contribute anything useful to the study of human language? (d) Can generative syntax contribute anything useful to the creation of LLMs? Students will be expected to do projects directly investigating these issues. 

Morphology as Syntax (MaS) I-III

Here are the links to the first three Morphology as Syntax workshops.  Hopefully, the fourth will be held soon. Keep your eyes open for announcements:

MaS I

MaS II

MaS III

MaS IV (TBA)

For convenience, I also include a link to Collins and Kayne 2023, which is the philosophical foundation of the MaS workshop series:

Collins and Kayne 2023

Creating a Syntax Syllabus at the Graduate Level

How do you write a syllabus for the introduction to syntax at the graduate level (Syntax I, II)? This blog post poses some basic questions, and provides some preliminary suggestions, based on my experience in writing such syllabi over the last thirty years. I got my PhD 1993, and have been teaching Syntax I and II regularly ever since. 

Although the framework I teach is Minimalism, most of the suggestions I make below could be used for a course based on a different syntactic framework. Most of them could also be used for an introductory course in a different subfield (e.g., phonology, semantics, acquisition, etc.).

Syllabus for Graduate Level Syntax I (Fall 2025) (Rough Draft)

 Here is a rough draft for my graduate level course Syntax I (Fall 2025) at NYU. 

Comments welcome!

Syllabus Syntax I (Fall 2025) (Rough Draft)

On Foundational Work in Syntactic Theory

A longtime concern of mine, never voiced until now, is the feeling I get that the field of syntax is not very committed to foundational work. 

Simplifying a lot, the typical linguistics research agenda runs something like the following:

Standard Paradigm for Syntactic Research

1.

Identify some interesting dataset from some language.

2.

Adopt a specific set of syntactic assumptions (the theory).

3.

Show how to account for the dataset within the assumptions.

4.

If needed, tweak the assumptions to account for the dataset.

5.

Show how your account is better than other possible accounts within the theory.

6.

Show how the tweaking does not lead to inaccurate empirical predications.

This is the kind of work that linguists are by far the most comfortable with. Any change in the theory should be directly related to the data being analyzed. If a new theory is proposed, it should be evaluated on the basis of its success in handling data. On this way of looking at things, the link between data and theory is very tight.

I personally have no problem with this kind of work. I have engaged in such analyses many times in my life. But foundational work is of a different character. 

By foundational work, I mean work at the deepest level, analyzing the most basic assumptions of the field. Can the assumptions be understood precisely with no handwaving? What is the logical relationship between the assumptions? Can certain assumptions be eliminated? Are there implicit assumptions in the current theory that need to be brought out? What is the motivation for the assumptions over other assumptions, which may be more or less equivalent in terms of empirical coverage? Why is linguistic theory the way it is (instead of some other logically conceivable way)?

Foundational work is often driven by the desire to understand the underlying order of a formal system, the symmetries and asymmetries, the hidden connections between seemingly unrelated assumptions, and interesting unexpected explanations for why the system is the way it is. The belief is that the human faculty for language is governed by simple and elegant principles, and it is our job as theoreticians to try to uncover them.

The research agenda runs roughly like this:

Foundational Paradigm for Syntactic Researc

1.

Identify a syntactic theory.

2.

Identify a foundational issue within that theory (related to the questions posed above).

3.

Try to gain insight into that foundational issue. 

My characterization of these two paradigms is overly simplistic. Of course, there may be empirical consequences of foundational work. And there are degrees along the scale defined by the two poles above. There is not always a clear-cut distinction.

But the value of the foundational work may just be to gain insight into how the theory works. One of the most interesting papers of this kind was Sam Epstein’s paper on c-command ‘Un Principled Syntax and the Derivation of Syntactic Relations’, which subjected a fundamental notion (c-command) to close conceptual scrutiny, asking questions about why c-command was defined the way it is (instead of some other way), and answering those questions in terms of a derivational model of syntax. My paper on ‘Eliminating Labels’(and related work by Daniel Seely) was written in a similar spirit, proposing that the syntactic notion of label is unnecessary in syntactic theory.

Through many personal experiences, I know that it is very hard to get colleagues and students to engage in thinking about foundational issues. When you start asking foundational questions, people’s eyes gloss over, and they start yawning. In fact, some people even seem to be uncomfortable with foundational work. For example, one reviewer felt obliged to add the following comment to their review of one of my foundational papers:

“I cannot say that this is the kind of paper I care much for. It carefully and clearly discusses an issue that leaves me entirely cold. “

This comment was not about the arguments of the paper. It was about the topic itself. According to the reviewer, the issue left them cold, with the implication that doing such work was not important, and maybe even misguided. I have had similar experiences not just with reviewers, but in many in other areas of academic life (e.g., course enrollment, hiring decisions, selection of colloquium speakers, etc.).

If I am right, it raises the question of why? Why is the field of linguistics so apathetic to foundational work? I think there are a few reasons.

First, foundational work takes a lot of time and effort, and the payoff is uncertain. The question is what counts as progress. You may think for years and years about the ‘copy versus repetition’ distinction or about the definition of c-command or about the nature of workspaces without resolving the issues, even though in the end you have a much deeper understanding. Does that count as progress? Can you write it up and publish it? Does it count as currency in the academic monetary system?

Second, foundational work does not fit into the standard syntactic paradigm, which is the paradigm everybody recognizes as valuable. Meditating on the definition of c-command seems less satisfactory than showing that a particular definition of Agree accounts for more data than a different definition of Agree. Linking to data is a certain way to measure progress. If the work is not tightly linked to data, it may not be clear what the progress is.

Third, the field is beset by what I can call ‘the busy hands syndrome’. If a theory provides many opportunities for analysis of various kinds, including interesting new mechanisms to play with in different ways, it attracts people. It supplies with them things to do. But foundational work does not have this character. Rather, one focuses on some conceptual issue to try to gain insight into it. 

Fourth, and related to the previous points, from the standpoint of a graduate student, the question is what kind of work will they be able to present at conferences and publish before they enter the job market. Committing to foundational work might not do the trick, if the rest of the field feels that it is not important.

To end this blog post, we can ask the question of how foundational work should fit into the future of the study of natural language syntax. If everybody is chasing data, competing on the best definition of Agree, or the scope of the impoverishment operation, or the number of projections in the left periphery, are we really making progress understanding the fundamental principles at play in syntactic theory? 

I am definitely not claiming that such empirical work is unimportant. Far from it, it is the bread and butter of syntactic theory. But contrary to popular belief in our field, having an empirically adequate theory does not mean that it is a good theory. If your theory provides easy explanations for X, it does not necessarily add to the value of your theory. This is why, years ago, Chomsky introduced the notion of ‘explanatory adequacy’, in order to go beyond the clever organization of data into rules. 

The purpose of foundational work is to push us out of our comfort zone with the goal of helping us to find deeper explanations for syntactic phenomena.

Remembering Haj Ross

When I was an undergraduate at MIT (1982-1985), I took Ken Hale’s graduate introduction to syntax. I remember a large guy in the back of the room asking difficult questions throughout the semester. I thought to myself, “How could I think of such questions to ask?” He turned out to be Haj Ross, another professor at MIT. He was taking Ken’s course to catch up on the so-called Government and Binding (GB) framework. 

After that, while still an undergraduate, I signed up for Haj’s seminar on Islands. There were very few people in the class (only 2 or 3 as I recall). He could go on about any syntax topic, bringing up endless interesting examples and counter-examples from English and other languages. He was one of my earliest models for what a syntactician is supposed to be like.

One day, as we were heading to the soda machine during break, he called the cans of soda “industrial sludge” and he told me an anecdote about the Navajo: when they make rugs, they intentionally leave a small error in the rug. I may be mistaken, but I think he wanted to tell me that no work is perfect, and that the imperfections are part of the beauty of the work. That little piece of wisdom has helped me finish writing many papers.

Later in my student days, I heard one professor refer to Haj (somewhat derisively) as ‘a walking counter-example’. But to me his facility with language and English syntax was something of a miracle.

I tried to stay in contact with him, especially later when I got to NYU (2005) and started collaborating with Paul Postal. I would send Haj papers from time to time, and he would send me observations. I was looking forward to learning all kinds of things from him. I had been asking him questions about what it was like to study with Zellig Harris, and he would answer. Now, there is nobody left to ask about that. Here is an excerpt:

“After his syntax class (there were about 25 of us, crunched into a small room, with not enough chairs for us all, none of us cared, we were in the Holy Presence, we knew our great good luck).   At the end of class, some of us would come up to him, with suggestions, questions, requests for a time to see him, the usual. And some questions about syntax. Nothing interesting to report on all of the above, except the questions about syntax. Most of those he would answer immediately, vocally.  But sometimes, rarely, the questioner would have hit something which pierced through to a higher level. He would reach into his righthand pocket of the decrepit jacket he always wore, and pull out a 3X5 yellow pad, and wrote down something that had caught his fancy. After writing it, the pad would go back to its invisible home. Of course, I longed to have a pocketable, 3X5-paddable question to go into the sacred pocket…I can still hope that maybe something that I had asked made it into the sacred pocket.”

Lastly, here is a great syntax observation from Haj, that I just dug up from e-mail today. As far as I know, nobody has ever pursued this observation, which is like a golden nugget.

Fellow negationists –

Just when you thought nothing else could possibly raise:

From an old folk song:

Oh the Erie was a-rising

And the gin was a-gettin’ low

And I scarcely think

We’ll get a drink

Till we get to Buffalo

Till we get to Buffalo.

NB:  *We’ll get a drink till we get to Buffalo.

Peace and Happy New Year!

Haj

Outline: Introduction to Syntax for Undergraduates (NYU)

Here are the lecture titles for my introduction to syntax at the undergraduate level:

Table of Contents

1. Syntactic Data

2. UG and I-Langauge

3. Syntactic Categories

4. Merge

5. Constituent Structure Tests

6. Functional Projections: TP

7. Complementizers, CP and Recursion

8. DP Structure

9. Complements versus Adjuncts

10. Lexicon: Theta-Roles

11. Introduction to the Binding Theory

12. English Auxiliary Verbs

13. Head Movement (V to T)

14. Head Movement: Do-Support and Affix Hopping

15. Head Movement: Structure Dependence

16. Movement (Internal Merge)

17. Passive and Case Theory

18. VP Internal Subject Hypothesis

19. Raising and Control (Subjects)

20. VP-Shells: Double Object Constructions

21. Raising and Control (Objects)

22. Principles and Parameters

A Scope Freezing Effect with Inverse Linking

Abstract: In this squib, I will discuss a scope freezing effect found with inverse linking. I will explain the freezing effect in terms of the theory of negation of Collins and Postal (2012). Then I will discuss the consequences of the scope freezing effect for the theory of inverse linking. 

Paper

On the Syntactic Status of Implicit Arguments: Greek as a Case Study (WCCFL 2023)

 In this paper, we investigated the behavior of implicit arguments with respect to diagnostics such as control, binding, and secondary predication, in the Greek verbal passive and nominals, comparing them to their English counterparts. Some diagnostics might at first sight suggest that the implicit argument is not projected in the Greek verbal passive, but we provide evidence to the contrary.

Paper

It can also be found here:

https://www.lingref.com/cpp/wccfl/41/index.html

A Note on Wh-in-Situ in English

Abstract:  The purpose of this squib is to show that wh-in-situ is productive in English, even outside of echo-questions and multiple wh-questions. I also discuss the relation of the data I adduce to quiz-show questions (Jackendoff 1994).

A Note on Wh-in-Situ in English

Quantifier Raising: Entailment and Inverse Scope (Syntax II, Spring 2025)

Consider the following two sentences, each involving an existential quantifier phrase and a universal quantifier phrase.

1.

a. Some boy loves every girl.

b. Every boy loves some girl.

In both cases, we can ask what the possible logical form representations of the sentence are, and what the truth conditions of those representations are. If we adopt the syntactic operation QR, then (1a) with inverse scope yields truth conditions that clearly distinguish it from (1a) with surface scope. The question of whether inverse scope is needed for sentences like (1b) is more intricate. This note goes into these issues in detail.

Applying QR to (1a), there are two logical form representations:

2.

LF1: (surface scope)

[TP <[some boy]1> [TP <[every girl]2> [TP DP1 loves DP2]]

LF2: (inverse scope)

[TP <[every girl]2> [TP <[some boy]1> [TP DP1 loves DP2]]

In these structures, the notation <…> indicates that the occurrence is not pronounced. In LF1, for example, [some boy] has two occurrences, but only the one in subject position is pronounced. Furthermore, in these representations the possibility of VP adjunct is ignored (see Fox 2002 for discussion).

These LF representations can be paraphrased as follows:

3. LF1 (paraphrase): There is some boy who loves every girl.

LF2 (paraphrase): For every girl, there is some boy who loves her.

Now consider the following two situations:

4.

S1: John love Sue, Mary and Kathy.

(and there are no other people or relationships involved)

S2: John loves Sue, Bill loves Mary, Chris loves Kathy.

(and there are no other people or relationships involved)

Calculating the truth value of each LF representation in each situation (actual semantic calculation omitted), we have the following results (SS = surface scope, IS = inverse scope):

5. S1 S2

LF1 (SS) true false

LF2 (IS) true true

This table shows that LF2 (inverse scope) is true in S2, whereas LF1 (surface scope) is not. These truth values provide an important argument for the existence of inverse scope. If inverse scope were not allowed, there is no way we could capture the intuition that (1a) (with structure LF2) is true in S2.

In the theory I presented in class (from May 1977, Fox 2002), inverse scope is accounted for in terms of QR. In inverse scope, the object undergoes QR to a scope position higher than the subject scope position (see LF2 above). Therefore, the data in (5) provides evidence supporting the covert movement operation QR.

This table shows that only S2 distinguishes the two LF representations, S1 does not. Therefore, it is clear that LF1 is stronger, in the sense that whenever LF1 is true, so is LF2, but not vice versa. In fact, using formal semantic tools, it is possible to prove the following:

6. a. LF1 entails LF2 (LF1 ⊨ LF2)

b. LF2 does not entail LF1 (LF2 ⊭ LF1)

When there is an entailment relation like this between two LFs, it is sometimes hard to distinguish them empirically. For example, in 5, both LF representations were true in S1. And so S1 could not be used to distinguish them.

With this background, consider now (1b) above. Applying QR to (1b), there are two logical form representations:

7.

LF1: (surface scope)

[TP <[every boy]1> [TP <[some girl]2> [TP DP1 loves DP2]]

LF2: (inverse scope)

[TP <[some girl]2> [TP <[every boy]1> [TP DP1 loves DP2]]

These LF representations can be paraphrased as follows:

8. LF1 (paraphrase): For every boy, there is some girl who he loves.

LF2 (paraphrase): There is some girl who every boy loves.

Now consider the following two situations:

9.

S1: John loves Sue, Bill loves Mary, Chris loves Kathy.

(and there are no other people or relationships involved)

S2: John love Sue, Bill loves Sue, Chris loves Sue.

(and there are no other people or relationships involved)

Calculating the truth value of each LF representation in each situation (calculation omitted), we have the following results:

10. S1 S2

LF1 (SS) true true

LF2 (IS) false true

In this case, LF2 is stronger than LF1, in the sense that LF1 is true whenever LF2 is true. In other words, we have the following entailment relations:

11. a. LF2 entails LF1 (LF2 ⊨ LF1)

b. LF1 does not entail LF2. (LF1 ⊭ LF2)

Now let’s ask what the evidence is for the inverse scope representation in LF2 of the sentence in (1b). Unfortunately, because of the entailment relations, there is no situation (such as S1 or S2) where LF2 (inverse scope) is true and LF1 (surface scope) is false. This makes it difficult to justify the inverse scope representation purely on the basis of situations where the LF representations are true. Therefore, the question is whether in this case one needs an inverse scope representation of (1b) at all.

To put matters more intuitively, concerning (1b), if it is true that there is some girl who every boy loves (inverse scope) then it is also true that for every boy, there is some girl who he loves (surface scope). So perhaps in this case we could say that only the surface scope representation in LF1 is possible, but it is vague as to whether everybody loves the same girl or not.

We can summarize as follows:

12.

a. Some boy loves every girl.

i. Inverse scope does not entail surface scope.

ii. There is a situation where inverse scope LF is true,

but surface scope LF is not true.

b. Every boy loves some girl.

i. Inverse scope entails surface scope.

ii. If inverse scope LF is true in some situation,

then so is surface scope LF.

Notice that LF1 and LF2 in (7) are not equivalent, and so they are false in different cases (see (10)). In particular LF1 is true in S1 but LF2 is false in S1. This leads to the suggestion that we could use falsity to distinguish the interpretations of LF1 and LF2.

So, given S1, consider the following dialogue:

13. (in S1)

A: Isn’t it strange that every boy loves some girl? (with structure LF2)

Intended: Isn’t it strange that there is some girl that every boy loves?

B: That is false, they all love different girls.

If this were an acceptable discourse it would provide evidence that both LF1 and LF2 are needed for (1b). Since it would show that LF2 (inverse scope) is possible, and is false in a particular situation. Unfortunately, it is not very easy to access the inverse scope interpretation in 13A, and the discourse seems forced.

Another similar way to distinguish LF1 and LF2 is through constructions like “It is false that” and “It is not the case that”. These constructions negate the embedded clause:

14. a. It is false that every boy loves some girl.

Intended: It is false that there is some girl that every boy loves.

b. It is not the case that every boy loves some girl.

Intended: It is not the case that there is some girl that every boy loves.

If LF2 (inverse scope) were a possible representation here, then the sentences would be true in S1. Once again, the facts are not that clear.

There are ways to bring out inverse scope. For example, adding the word particular makes it much easier:

15. a. It is false that every boy loves some particular girl.

Intended: It is false that there is some particular girl that every boy loves.

b. It is not the case that every boy loves some particular girl.

Intended: It is not the case that there is some particular girl that every boy loves.

This kind of sentence where one is negating the inverse scope LF representations suggests that inverse scope is also needed in examples such as (1b).

In summary, based on truth conditions, it is easier to justify an inverse scope LF representation for (1a) than it is for (1b). However, given the clear need for an inverse scope LF representation for (1a), the null hypothesis is that such an inverse scope representation should also be available for (1b). That conclusion leaves open the difficult status of the judgments in (13) and (14).

New Horizons in Morphology as Syntax: My Three Published Papers

MaS (Morphology as Syntax) is a framework which asks the question of whether putative morphological phenomena can be can be accounted for in terms of syntactic principles and operations. In MaS there is no morphological component, nor are there any post-syntactic morphological operations.

So far, I have been able to publish three papers in this framework. I list the papers, and their abstracts below, in chronological order. These three papers are enough to get a general feel for the framework, and some tools to begin working with it.

I would really love to hear from people who are doing work in a related spirt, taking syntax seriously in the analysis of putative morphological generalizations.

1. Spanish usted as an Imposter (2021, Probus, with Francisco Ordóñez)

Abstract: Across dialects, Spanish uses the third person forms usted and ustedes to refer to the addressee. In this squib, we propose an imposter analysis of these forms in the framework of Collins and Postal (2012. Imposters. MIT Press, Cambridge.). (link)

2. Towards a Theory of Morphology as Syntax (2023, Studies in Chinese Linguistics, with Richard Kayne)

Abstract: Phenomena traditionally thought of as morphological can be accounted for in terms of syntactic operations and principles, hence bringing forth questions that traditional morphology fails to ask (for instance, concerning the licensing of empty morphemes). The language faculty contains no specific morphological component, nor any post-syntactic morphological operations. (link)

3. A Syntactic Approach to Case Contiguity (2025, Continua)

Abstract: Building on the empirical results and theoretical insights of Caha (2013), I show howto derive the Case Contiguity Constraint in a syntactic theory of morphology. In particular, I show how to derive *ABA in the domain of case syncretism without appeal to late insertion. (link)

How to Syntax 3 (‘only’ Modifying Noun Phrases)

This is the third of a series of blog posts showing how I think about a syntax problem when I first notice it. For the first and second installment, see:

How to Syntax I (the now that-Construction)

How to Syntax 2 (Adverbs with Attributive Adjectives)

That first glimpse of a problem is an important period in thinking about syntax. I will occasionally choose phenomena that I notice, and talk about them in an informal fashion, breaking down the process of preliminary syntactic exploration. That is, I am just thinking off the top of my head (brainstorming), with few or no revisions. Ideally, I will give myself a time period of two to three hours maximum to prevent polishing. The focus of the discussion will be on process. I am not trying to come up with a polished analysis. Of course, if people suggest references for me to look at, I will look at them later, but that would be a second stage of thought, not the preliminary exploration.

Data Discovery

I do not recall how I first noticed the construction. I have known about it since at least Fall 2021, where I mentioned it briefly in a seminar I taught. But I kept it on the back burner, knowing at some point I would get back to it.

Combinatorial Basics

I want to investigate phrases such as the following:

(1) a. He is the only candidate.

b. The only candidate is sitting over there.

c. I met the only candidate.

For convenience, I will occasionally refer to this as the ‘only’-NP construction. An alternative involves the expression ‘one and only’, as in ‘He is the one and only candidate.’ Another related expression is ‘the lone candidate’. I leave aside these alternatives for now.

At first glance, the construction consists of a definite determiner, followed by ‘only’, followed by a noun. 

An indefinite determiner is difficult or impossible to get:

(2) a. *He is an only candidate.

b. *An only candidate is sitting over there.

c. *I met an only candidate.

The examples in (2) all seem unacceptable to me, putting aside fixed phrases like ‘an only child’. Similarly, in the following (b) examples, the determiners with ‘only’ seem unacceptable:

(3) a. John is the only person I know.

b. John is a (*only) person I know.

(4) a. The only weird person is sitting over there.

b. That (*only) weird person is sitting over there.

(5) a. The only candidate is sitting over there.

b. Every (*only) candidate is sitting over there.

But possessors work fine:

(5) a. He is my only friend.

b. My only friend is sitting over there.

c. I met my only friend.

(6) a. his only friend

b. your only friend

c. their only friend

When there is an adjective or a numeral in the DP, it must follow ‘only’:

(7) a. The only big dog was in the corner.

b. *The big only dog was in the corner.

(8) a. The only two reporters were out for lunch.

b. *The two only reporters were out for lunch.

Although focus particles such as ‘only’ and ‘even’ overlap in their distributions (see (9) and (10)), the focus particle ‘even’ cannot be used in the same way (see (11)):

(9) a. Only John left early.

b. Even John left early.

(10) a. John only likes Mary.

b. John even likes Mary.

(11) a. *He is the even candidate.

b. *The even candidate is sitting over there.

c. *I met the even candidate.

Paraphrase and Entailment

Usually when ‘only’ modifies a constituent X, X is in focus. The general scheme is this, where (b) and (c) are entailments of (a):

(12) a. Only John came to the party.

b. John came to the party, but nobody else did.

c. It is not the case that Mary (or anybody else) came to the party.

In other words, for this example any DP substitution for John is false, as shown in (12c).

Similarly, when ‘only’ appears with a predicative constituent:

(13) a. John is only watching TV.

b. John is watching TV, but he is not doing anything else.

c. It is not the case that John is working (or doing anything else).

Now consider how such a paraphrase would work with the ‘only’-NP construction:

(14) a. The only dog was in the corner.

b. The dog was in the corner, but for no other x was the x in the corner.

c. It was not the case that the cat was in the corer (or any other animal).

These truth conditions are just wrong. Clearly, for (14a), it is possible that a cat could also be in the corner. In other words, interpreting [the only NOUN] as a focus construction where NOUN is in focus does not give the right results.

So what is the right paraphrase? It seems to be the following:

(15) a. The only dog was in the corner.

b. The x such that only x is a dog was in the corner.

(16) a. I saw the only person I know.

b. I saw the x such only x is a person I know.

In formal notation, the translation is (assuming a Fregean account of the definite article):

(17) a. the only dog

b. ιx[dog(x) ∧ ∀y[dog(y) --> x = y]]

‘The unique x such that x is a dog and for every y, 

if y is a dog, the y = x’

But such a definition poses a bit of a conundrum. Consider the definition of the definite article from Heim and Kratzer (pg. 75):

(18) a. [[the]] = λf. f ɛ D<e,t> and there is exactly one x such that f(x) = 1.

                 the unique y such that f(y) = 1.

b. [[the dog]] = Presupposition: there is exactly one x such that dog(x) = 1.

        Denotation: the unique y such that dog(y) = 1.

Comparing (17) and (18), it looks like ‘only’ is just restating the presupposition of the definite article. In other words, ‘only’ appears to be semantically vacuous when appearing with the definite article. But is this true?

(19) a. My friend is over there.

b. My only friend is over there.

If you and I are at a party, and I say (19a) pointing to the corer, you might infer that my unique friend at the party is over there. There is a uniqueness presupposition, but it is very fluid and flexible. In fact, if I say (19a), it could be the friend of mine that we were just talking about, even if I have lots of friends at the party.

On the other hand, (19b) seems less fluid and more rigid. Once again, if we are at the party, and I say (19b) pointing to the corer, your natural inference is that I don’t have any other friends in my life. If I wanted it to be clear we were talking about friends at the party, I would have to say: ‘My only friend at this party is over there.’

So it seems at the very least there is a difference in the possibility for domain restriction between the two forms (with and without ‘only’). I leave investigating this to further work, since today’s session is just supposed to be the first glimpse of the construction.

Speculations on Structure

As part of the first glimpse into the construction, I would like to speculate on the syntactic structure. The value of the speculation is that is provides a concrete way to test further predictions (against the structure). So consider the following sentence repeated from above:

(20) a. The only dog was in the corner.

b. The x such that only x is a dog was in the corner.

My suggestion is that ‘only’ does not modify its sister semantically in the same way that the focus particle normally modifies its sister (creating a quantificational structure, quantifying over alternatives). 

First, I assume that in definite DPs like ‘the dog’, ‘the person’, there is a null category which is the argument of the noun phrase (see Collins 2024 for discussion, see also Koopman 2003, 2005). For convenience, let’s call that empty category ec:

(21) [the [ec dog]]

Second, this is enough to start to account for ‘only’-NP, if we say that ‘only’ modifies the empty category, with the interpretation in (22b).

(22) a. [the [[only ec] dog]]

b. the x such that only x is a dog.

I leave out the labels of the constituents, just giving the bare minimum for this first glace.

Combinatorial Basics Revisited

Now that I have put in place the sketch of an analysis, we can revisit some of the basic combinatorial properties listed above. For lack of time, I will not discuss all of them, but consider again the ordering of an adjective and ‘only’, repeated below:

(23) a. The only big dog was in the corner.

b. *The big only dog was in the corner.

I assume the structure is:

(24) a. [the [ec big dog]]

b. the x such that only x is a big dog

In other words, ‘big dog’ is acting as the predicate, and ec is the subject, so there is no way for ec to intervene between ‘big’ and ‘dog’. Therefore, since ‘only’ modifies ec, there is no way for ‘only’ to appear between ‘big’ and dog’.

Negative Polarity Item Licensing

A well-known property of ‘only’-phrases is that they license negative polarity items, as shown in (25):

(25) a. Only John knows any physics.

b. *John knows any physics.

But clearly, such licensing does not extend to the ‘only’-NP construction:

(26) a. *The only candidate knows any physics.

b. *The candidate knows any physics.

The difference between (25) and (26) follows from the analysis I outlined above in (22) above since on that analysis ‘only’ takes scope internal to the DP. In other words, in (25a) [only John] takes scope over the entire clause. In (26a), ‘only’ takes scope internal to the subject DP, not over the entire clause.

However, internal to the modified NP, a NPI becomes possible:

(27) a. *The candidate who has ever been to France is John.

b. The only candidate who has ever been to France is John.

This fact could also follow from the analysis is if the correct way to break it down is:

(28) a. the only candidate who has ever been to France

b. the x such that only x is a candidate and only x has ever been to France

I leave working out details to future work.

Technical Glitch

My preliminary analysis rests on the assumption that ‘only’ can modify an empty category ec. But in general, it does not look like ‘only’ can modify empty categories.

(29) a. I want (only) Mary to go.

b. I want (*only) PRO to go.

Intended: ‘I want only myself to go.’

(30) a. Only John left.

b. The man that (*only) ec left.

Example (29b) shows that ‘only’ cannot modify PRO. Example (30b) shows that ‘only’ cannot modify the trace of subject extraction in a relative clause.

It is unclear to me for the moment how to get around this problem. But acknowledging technical glitches is an important part of the discovery process. It could lead you to reject your initial analysis, or to give a much better analysis down the road.

One possibility, no considered so far, is that ‘the’ itself is the argument of the noun, so the structure would be the following:

(31) [[the only] dog]

If this were the case, it would look a bit like post focus ‘only’ in the following example:

(32) John only is allowed to enter the fort.

I put the issue aside for now.

Conclusion

I have spent a few hours analyzing the ‘only’-NP construction. The preliminary syntactic methods I have applied are the following:

(31)

a. Combinatorial basics

b. Paraphrase

c. Speculations on structure

d. Explaining facts in terms of structure

e. NPI licensing

f. Technical Glitch

The theoretical significance of the construction is that it may support the structure of DPs and the Argument Criterion as outlined in Collins 2024.

 

Grammatical Analysis I: Merge (Lecture 4, Spring 2025)

 Here is the lecture on Merge, in the fourth lecture.

After this, Merge is the basis for everything we talk about in the semester.

Lecture 4: Merge

Grammatical Analysis I (Assignment 2)(Spring 2025)

 Here is my second assignment for the undergraduate introduction to syntax.

Chris

Assignment 2

Principles of Argument Structure: A Merge-Based Approach (Concept Map)

 This is my first attempt to display the connection between the various concepts in my recent MIT Press monograph. Let me know what you think!

Basic Skills (A versus A'-Movement)

Syntax II Spring 2025

Week 2: Basic Skills: A versus A’-Movement

By the end of the semester, a student taking Syntax II (graduate level) should have the following basic skills. 

1.

Be able to argue whether or not there is a movement relationship between two positions X and Y.

2.

Be able to define A-position and A’-position. 

3.

Be able to give a wide range of example sentences illustrating A-movement and A’-movement in English. The student should be able to draw plausible tree diagrams for each of these examples (e.g., tough-movement).

See Class Exercise

4.

For any particular example of movement, the student should be able to argue (using various diagnostics) that it is A or A’-movement.

5.

Be able to list the main properties distinguishing A-movement and A’-movement (e.g., binding, reconstruction, parasitic gaps, improper movement, weak crossover, etc.). The student should be able to define all the relevant principles that enter into these properties (e.g., they should be able to define weak crossover, they should know about the copy theory of movement).

6.

For each property in (5), the student should be able to give example sentences illustrating that property. For example, the student should be able to show that A-movement does not show Weak Crossover Effects. Likewise, the student should be able to show that A-movement does not give rise to condition C reconstruction effects.

Schoolhouse Rock Videos

I grew up watching these videos all the time. The tunes are very catchy and they are a pretty good popular source of information on basic grammatical categories. I have no idea whether people outside the US know of them.

Last week, in my undergraduate syntax class, I recommended to the students that they watch them. We don't literally follow the definitions in the videos, but they are an entertaining way to review.

Schoolhouse Rock (Grammar Rock) Videos

A Noun is a Person Place or Thing

Busy Prepositions

Conjunction Junction

Interjections

Lolly Lolly Lolly Get Your Adverbs Here

Rufus Xavier Sarsaparilla

The Tale of Mr. Morton

Unpack Your Adjectives

Verb That’s What’s Happening

Grammatical Analysis I (Assignment 1)(Spring 2025)

Here is my first assignment for undergraduate syntax. It is all about the internet.

I am trying to keep up with the times.

GA I Assignment 1

LSA 2025 Workshop: Foundations of Minimalist Syntax (videos)

 Here are the videos from the LSA workshop.

You have to download them.

Video: Parts I and II  (old)

Video: Parts I and II

(Part II for Chris Collins starts at around 17:20)

Video: Part III (old)

Video: Part III